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What factors must a stateless nation possess in order to gain political autonomy? This 
question is explored through the perspective of Carpatho-Rusyns, an East Slavic stateless nation 
with a largely unknown, yet rich and distinct, history and culture. Throughout modern history, 
the Rusyns have made three significant attempts to gain political autonomy and become a semi-
independent entity. I argue that stateless nations that possess high levels of the elements of 
political opportunity structure, cultural maintenance, and economic functioning are more likely 
to succeed in their efforts to gain political autonomy than those stateless nations who do not. 
Each of these factors interact with each other to produce a level of success or failure during the 
autonomy movement. I begin by providing a historical background of Carpatho-Rusyns. I then 
examine the concepts of state and nation, diaspora relations, and autonomy. I follow with an 
examination of each of the three periods in which Rusyns made a significant attempt to gain 
political autonomy and analyze their level of success through their levels of political opportunity 
structure, forms of cultural maintenance, and economic functioning. Each of these periods have a 

















The state, as defined by Max Weber, is “a human community that successfully claims the 
monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force within a given territory (1946).” A state 
describes an accepted government with the legitimate authority to impose laws on its 
constituents. It functions to maintain security and order within their borders as protecting those 
borders from external threats. 
While the state has an objective function, the idea of a nation is much more abstract. A.D. 
Smith defines a nation as, “a named human community occupying a homeland, and having 
common myths and a shared history, a common public culture, a single economy and public 
rights and duties for all members (2001, 13).” Members of a nation often share a particular 
ethnicity and are conscious of unity and interests, leading to an institutionalization of their 
culture. Perhaps this is one of the most telling factors of a nation – it differentiates itself from 
other ethnic groups as they claim sovereignty. The individuals within the nation often feel that 
the history and culture associated with the geographic region is a major facet of their being, and 
therefore feel a strong sense of national identity, so much so that they are willing to make 
legitimate political petitions to their government or other governments to be recognized for it. 
There is a need to focus on the political and social transformations that take place once this 
nation feels unified and will consciously act in its name (Kuntszch, 2009). This is the basis of 
what sets nations apart from ethnic groups. 
Nations are usually associated with a particular territory, however, stateless nations 
combine terms to describe a nation that does not possess its own state or the features of a state, 
such as a recognized government or borders. Stateless nations have usually made efforts to gain 
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this legitimacy as it argues it should be a state or possess some form of sovereignty. Regardless 
of geography, those who are a part of these stateless nations feel a connection to the territory of a 
stateless nation and believe the geography and the history that has occurred there constitutes a 
part of their collective identity. 
 This is the case for the Carpatho-Rusyn people, an East Slavic stateless nation with 
origins in the Carpathian Mountains of Europe. Carpatho-Rusyns, who are also referred to as 
Rusnaks, Carpatho-Russians, Ruthenians, or just Rusyns, have inhabited the northern regions of 
the Eastern Carpathians since the Early Middle Ages. While Rusyns have never possessed an 
enduring and internationally recognized territorial state, the group has maintained an identity 
distinct from that of the larger powers that have ruled over them throughout their history, which 
has influenced and motivated them in their efforts to gain political autonomy.  
 Autonomy is defined by Paul Robert Magocsi as self-rule that, “assumes that a 
representative organ of a particular territory or region has the right to issue laws and decrees 
which become valid for that given territory. An autonomous region is not sovereign but exists 
within the framework of a higher legal-administrative body…a legal-administrative entity of a 
lower entity (2015, 578).” Defining this term is important as many stateless nations, such as the 
Carpatho-Rusyn people, overall have no desire to become a completely sovereign entity. In this 
sense, a larger governing power would still have authority over the Rusyns, but the autonomous 
facet would be able to function with semi-independence. 
 The Carpatho-Rusyns have made three significant pushes to gain political autonomy for 
their stateless nation –in 1848, in the interwar period of 1918 to 1939, and finally, in 1991. This 
thesis seeks to assess the most notable conditions that factor into a stateless nation’s level of 
success in gaining political autonomy, and to situate the case of the Carpatho-Rusyns within that 
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context. Each of these factors vary in their role in success (or failure) depending on the time or 
place. This is made clear as I analyze each significant push for autonomy through the lens of 
these factors. 
 Significant populations of Carpatho-Rusyns currently live separated by state borders in 
which some are recognized as Rusyn and some are not. Others have fallen out of touch with their 
ethnic heritage as a Rusyn, especially in the diaspora. This reality cannot be analyzed in isolation 





Background and Historical Context 
The most populous communities of Rusyns currently occupy four regions, each with 
different names: the Lemko region of southeastern Poland, the Prešov region of northeastern 
Slovakia, the Transcarpathian oblast of western Ukraine, and the Maramures of north-central 
Romania (Magocsi, 2015, 579). Rusyns have inhabited regions of the eastern Carpathian 
Mountains since the Early Middle Ages. The official population of Rusyns worldwide is 75,000 
to 110,000, although some speculate the actual number could be much higher at 1.2-1.6 million. 
As has historically been the case with stateless groups, Rusyns have been reluctant to identify 
themselves or have simply not been recorded by their governments. Therefore, it is impossible to 
know the exact number of Rusyns that exist today (Magocsi, 1995). Three-quarters of Rusyns are 
found within the borders of Ukraine’s Transcarpathian oblast.  
Rusyns possess their own language, which belongs to the Slavic branch of the Indo-European 
language and is classified as an Eastern Slavic dialect. The Rusyn language has significant 
influences from the Old Church Slavonic liturgical language; in fact, the only written evidence of 
East Slavic inhabitants of the Carpathian Mountains in the twelfth to fifteenth centuries is in 
Church Slavonic (Kushko, 2007, 114). Because of the other significant ethnic populations in the 
same region, dialects are heavily influenced by Polish, Slovak, and Hungarian vocabulary. 
However, Rusyn is written using the Cyrillic alphabet, which is reflective of the fluid nature of 
their stateless ethnic belonging. Paul Robert Magocsi, the leading expert in Carpatho-Rusyn 
literature, states that, “The very language or series of dialects that Rusyns speak reflect the 
influences of both cultural spheres. Thus, while their speech clearly belongs to the realm of East 
Slavic languages, much of their vocabulary, pronunciational stress, and even syntax is West 
Slavic (1992, 99).” Attempts to codify a Rusyn literary language did not occur until the late 
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1800s, and at present, there have been no serious attempts to do this for states with minority 
populations of Rusyns such as Hungary or Romania (Kushko, 2007, 128). Many Rusyns use the 
term “po nashomu,” which is roughly translated to “people like us who speak our language,” to 
describe the dialect due to their identification with various states throughout their history 
(Crispin, 2006, 4). 
 
Historical Background: Pre-1848-1918 
While the term Rusyn, which will be used interchangeably with Carpatho-Rusyn in this 
thesis, is derived from the word Rus’, the origin of the Carpatho-Rusyns is not exclusively 
related to the Kievan Rus’. Rusyns are rather considered to be descendants of the Early Middle 
Ages tribes of White Croats. Initial settlements were most likely sparse as the flora and fauna of 
the region is an ever-changing environment, and the forests in the Carpathian Mountains were 
too thick to pass through easily, let alone settle and control, in the early medieval period (Lane, 
2001, 690). There are Carpatho-Rusyns that contend that their land is the “Uhrheimat,” or 
original homeland, of all Slavs as their origin is still somewhat ambiguous (Best, 2013, 9).  
The year 1453 was a clear turning point in the lifestyles of Carpatho-Rusyns and the region 
in which they inhabited as a whole. After the fall of Constantinople to the Ottomans, the status of 
Carpatho-Rusyns, who were already living as serfs under their respective governments, was 
further reduced. This was exacerbated by the ongoing rivalry between Transylvania and 
Habsburg-ruled Royal Hungary, which divided Rusyn communities due to ever-shifting state 
boundaries. As a result, Carpatho-Rusyn villages were caught in the midst of the conflict and 
suffered from ensuing disease, famine, and destruction throughout the 16th and 17th century 
(Magocsi, 2015, 80). 
 
 11 
Throughout the 1500s, Orthodox Christian Rusyns experienced less freedoms in Hungary 
and Poland due to the predominance of Roman Catholicism. Even though the Union of Brest 
(1596) and the Union of Uzhorod (1646) led to the creation of the Greek Catholic Church – to 
which many Rusyns converted and were provided with far more cultural and social benefits 
under Catholic rulers – they remained serfs to Hungarian and Polish landlords until 1848 due to 
their ethnic minority status. These conversions to Greek Catholicism mostly occurred throughout 
the 17th and 18th centuries and played an important part in the first push for autonomy, especially 
in 1772 when the Habsburg Empire acquired portions of land that, for the first time, 
encompassed all Carpatho-Rusyns within one state.  
Under Habsburg Empress Maria Theresa and her son Joseph II, the status of the Uniate 
Church was gradually enhanced, and cultural centers were established in the eastern region of 
Uzhhorod and the western region of Prešov. In this period of time, maintaining an identity as 
Carpatho-Rusyn was so accepted that the Rusyn language was taught in normal schools, and 
records show that Habsburg authorities carried out censuses within the region that prove their 
presence (Lane, 2001, 690). Benefits were awarded to Rusyns and other minority peoples living 
within the Habsburg Empire during this time, but the wave of Pan-Slavism that washed over the 
region in the 1830s called on those groups to culturally and politically cooperate in order to 
advocate for their own sense of national identity. Doing this was vital to the survival of Rusyn 
culture as the group was also working against the pulls of Hungary’s “Reform Era” and early 
years of Magyarization.  
Magyarization policies officially began in the 1870s, and many elite members of the Rusyn 
community welcomed the change in nationality as it provided political advantages in the region. 
Those who began to emigrate to the United States were able to create institutions and 
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communities in the diaspora that enabled them to stay connected to their identity. According to 
Paul Best, “…beginning in 1880, masses of Carpatho-Rusyns…were recruited to the burgeoning 
mines and factories of eastern North America. Maybe half the Rusyns left their mountain homes” 
during this time (2013, 10). The largest wave of migration occurred in the first two decades of 
the twentieth century for the Carpatho-Rusyns. Before 1914, over 225,000 Rusyns emigrated to 
the United States. In the first fourteen years of the century, 71% of this group were young men 
(Magocsi, 1993, 11). Most Rusyns relocated to urban areas of the northeastern regions such as 
Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania and eastern Ohio where they often lived communally and found work 
in coal mines and steel mills, or the tri-state factory area of New York, New Jersey, and 
Connecticut (Carpatho-Rusyn Society). As these cities provided jobs, small communities of 
Rusyns developed. This shift in the extent of the Rusyn diaspora population from the mid-19th 
century to the early 20th century was perhaps one of the most significant influences in the 
Rusyn’s second push for autonomy, as the advancements in transportation, communication, and 
quality of life also assisted in political coordination and mobilization. 
 
1918-present 
The onset of World War I and World War II halted the emigration and socioeconomic 
growth rate for many Rusyns. The Carpatho-Rusyn territory was drawn into the middle of World 
War I as Austria-Hungary fought against Russia, and the fighting amongst these larger powers 
led to village destruction, shifts in state loyalty, and loss of life. World War I began at a time 
when thousands of Carpatho-Rusyns had already emigrated to the United States and established 
communities, churches, and fraternal organizations. Although aspects of life were repaired and 
during the interwar period, the “Rusyn question” was not again raised until the end of World 
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War II, this time by leading figures in the region’s Orthodox church to Premier Joseph Stalin. 
Petitions were offered to Stalin that the autonomous territory would be joined to the Soviet 
Union, however, the request fell on deaf ears as “Moscow did not need yet another ‘republic’ 
within the Soviet fold (Magocsi, 2015, 584).” Many Rusyns themselves did not support a Soviet-
supported Rusyn territory, and while leading representatives had previously joined forces to fight 
for autonomy (Magocsi, 2015, 582). Rusyn-Americans were shocked to find that Subcarpathian 
Rus’ was to be incorporated into the Soviet Union in June of 1945 – ceded by a provisional 
Czechoslovak parliament without Rusyn representation – and were working to liquidate the 
Greek Catholic Church.  
Magocsi writes that, “Within less than a year Transcarpathian Ukraine, designated simply 
Transcarpathia, was reduced to the status of an oblast like any other within the Soviet Ukraine 
(2018, 87).” Even though Rusyn-Americans petitioned the United States State Department and 
the newly organized United Nations, as well as convene a special Carpatho-Russian Congress to  
politically protest the Soviet Union, the most they could do to make a tangible difference was to 
deny finances or resources to Soviet-held territory. Rusyn-American lacked in government 
representation within the United States and Eastern Europe, which again proved to be a barrier 
difficult to cross. Because they had no strong, unified political voice that was cohesive across the 
Atlantic, it was easy for larger state powers with a seemingly infinite amount of resources to take 
advantage of their smaller, less educated, and more passive numbers. 
Initially, the many technological advances that the new Communist regime brought to the 
small agricultural Rusyn villages were alluring. Reports that new factories, electricity, free health 
care, and improvements in the educational system excited villagers and shifted their mindset 
away from an almost exclusive dependence on agriculture. However, the removal of traditional 
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aspects of Carpatho-Rusyn life, the erasure of privately-owned land, and outlawing the claim to a 
Rusyn nationality eventually revealed the many negative facets of Soviet Communism 
(Csernicsko and Ferenc, 2014, 409). On a regional level, the genocide, ethnic cleansing, and 
mass migration patterns during World War II effectively simplified the ethnic map of the region. 
Smith and Cordell observe that, “…the notion of collective minority rights all but disappeared 
from the European agenda. In fact, it was…assumed that the issue had ceased to be of any 
importance or relevance to the modern world (2007, 341).” For decades, national or minority 
identities were suppressed, undiscussed, or erased under socialist governments. Annegret Haase 
reflects that, “Minorities…did not admit their ethnic or religious identity when it differed from 
the majority, stopped using their language in public, and felt neglected compared to the majority. 
At the same time, those that were a part of the diaspora often hid their identity from others, 
especially in Western countries, during this time period, which led to the loss of passing 
ethnography down to younger generations. Stateless nations with unrecognized boundaries 
especially suffered as individual cross-border contacts were essentially impossible (2017, 222).” 
Czechoslovakia’s new Communist policymakers rejected any idea of a Rusyn autonomous 
territory, and within a few years accepted the view that the population was – and should only be 
– recognized as Ukrainian (Halemba, 2015). A decade after this new regime began, in the 1960s, 
Rusyns who were desperate to escape poverty and suppression began to claim their identity as 
Slovak in order to migrate to Czechoslovakia, where conditions were better (Magocsi, 2018, 93). 
Several thousand Rusyns made this choice to claim an alternative and more official “political” 
identity, rather than maintain their ethnic identity as Rusyn, in order to seek a more comfortable 
lifestyle. Those who remained in Ukraine received little external help. Magocsi writes that 
overall, “Rusyn political involvement in Europe was essentially a first-generation phenomenon. 
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Since World War II, the vast majority of the older immigrants and their descendants were 
basically apolitical and had virtually no concern with the fate of the homeland when it was part 
of the communist-ruled Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Union (2005, 92).” At the same time, 
United States leaders frankly took no interest in the plights of Eastern European minority 
populations during this time – their agenda was focused around missions that were on a national, 
ideological scale. After the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1989, Rusyns consolidated to make 
another push for autonomy, but it was failed to be recognized by the Ukrainian government. 
Currently, people in the homeland who identify as Rusyn struggle to agree on fundamental 
visions for autonomy, especially in the case of an official national language (Magocsi, 2015, 
583). Rusyn organizations, such as those that are media or cultural, often operate with a dual 
nature: for example, in Ukraine, there are cultural organizations that reflected both “distinctly 
Rusyn” and “Rusyn-Ukrainian” orientations, and each village and town has their own dynamic in 
which one orientation is more visible than the other. Data collected by Kristina Cantin from 
individuals living in the region show that while people identify as Rusyn, they also feel an 
affinity to a larger Ukrainian, Slovak, or Polish entity, and experiences both of these as 
belonging to a larger East Slav whole. Furthermore, it is clear that the “structural boundary-
making factors and actions of state-level politicians…do influence the identification possibilities 
of [these] people,” as Cantin found in her study that there is a contrast between the celebration of 
Rusyn culture between those in Slovakia and those in Ukraine – Rusyns in Slovakia are more 
prideful about being Rusyn than Rusyns in Ukraine (Cantin, 2013, 860). Literature does not 
provide an in-depth analysis of how the Carpatho-Rusyn diaspora, especially in the United 
States, relates to this spectrum of identities. However, it can be speculated that because of their 
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rapid assimilation to American culture and the minute size of the Carpatho-Rusyn region, they 







Stateless nations create and maintain certain institutions to preserve and propel their 
history and culture, and furthermore, to validate the group in the eyes of the regional and 
international state community. Institutions can include entities such as governing bodies, 
religious groups, or cultural centers. They are essential in preserving both intangible pieces of 
culture, such as statutes or authoritative documents, and tangible parts of culture, such as dress, 
music, religion, and language. 
Stateless nations maintain institutions so organized that they have the ability to petition 
for some form of legitimate governmental recognition. Many nations have undergone campaigns 
to gain political independence or sovereignty from the state or states of which they are a part. 
This process includes creating a separate governing body and set of laws, as well as the members 
of the nation becoming citizens of a completely new entity that would gain varying degrees of 
formal recognition or acceptance from states within the international community.  
Other stateless nations, however, rather aim for political autonomy. Paul Robert Magocsi 
defines autonomy as self-rule that “assumes that a representative organ of a particular territory or 
region has the right to issue laws and decrees which become valid for that given territory. An 
autonomous region is not sovereign but exists within the framework of a higher legal-
administrative body…a legal-administrative entity of a lower entity (2015, 578).” Defining this 
term is integral as many stateless nations overall have no desire to become a completely 
sovereign entity. In this sense, a larger governing power would still have authority over the 




Indeed, while the binding of a stateless nation is found in the shared history and ethnicity 
of its individuals, one of their ultimate goals is to seek political recognition from those around 
them. Mylonas and Shelef argue that byproduct of the competitive environment in which these 
political movements are embedded may alter the group’s rhetoric about the extent of the desired 
national state to meet immediate political challenges. While the movements of stateless nations 
are fundamentally political organizations, nationalist and cultural “myths” intertwine to increase 
the cohesion, unity, and mobilizational capacity of the groups as they resonate regardless of their 
artificiality. These legends and stories about the group has the power to influence opinions on 
what goals of the group are valuable and how they can be achieved (2014, 760). Others 
acknowledge the significance that nationalist and cultural myths can possess, but argue that 
while it enhances the mobilization of group discontent, it can hinder more permanent settlements 
as it has little to do with concrete political aims (Zimmerman, 2015, 45). Cultural beliefs can 
influence political aspirations, and political legitimacy has the potential to strengthen ones 
cultural sense of self. It is clear that the political and cultural spheres of a stateless nation are 
often intertwined in these processes.  
Other literature seeks to examine other vehicles of success for these stateless nations. 
Kuntzsch argues that the success and survival of stateless nations are better understood through 
the use of violent strategies pursued by radical nationalist groups. Although the use of violence is 
ethically problematic, nationalists must present the nation as a victim of government oppression 
and their actions as a legitimate form of self-defense. This strategy has been proven successful 
by the Kosovo Liberation Army and Front de libération du Québec groups (2009). On the other 
hand, Moltchanova describes how if each state or non-state actor has an equal right to self-
determination under the law, stateless nations are supplied with a legal framework that allows 
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them to assure their existence through peaceful and legitimate means. Because of this, 
“justifications of terrorism do not apply…the members of national groups cannot legitimately 
claim that they either have a just cause for asymmetrical warfare or that terrorism is their last 
resort in the response to a supreme emergency (2005, 206).” This “moderate” form of protest 
and, “…deliberate avoidance of violence [may] open a limited space for interaction with a non-
democratic regime without repression and this in turn may encourage potential supporters to join 
activities,” as seen with the Kosovo Serb movement in the 1980s (Vladislavjevic, 2002). The 
contrast of these arguments presents that there is no clear framework for stateless nations to 
successfully gain political autonomy, especially when each group operates under different social, 
political, and economic positions at the time or location of their movement. The relationship 
between the objective and subjective, or the socio and technical, is thought-provoking and 
complex, and this partially explains the factors behind why gaining autonomy has been a long 
pathway for many stateless nations. 
 
Diaspora 
In its most basic form, a diaspora is a scattered population that has deviated from their 
original geographic homeland. It can be defined as “an imagined community of emigrants and 
their descendants dispersed from a professed homeland (Vertovec, 2009).” While descendants of 
emigrants have not personally experienced living in the homeland, they can still feel that their 
identity is associated with the geographic location of their ancestors. Furthermore, the homeland 
is professed by the diaspora itself, not by a state or another entity with governmental authority. 
Determining who gets to define the components of the diaspora is meaningful, and in this case, 
the diaspora does not have to belong to a geographic location that has internationally recognized 
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boundaries. Alexandra Alonso and Harris Mylonas discuss the positive relationship between 
literature on diasporas and the interpretation and use of the term, both in academic and in policy 
debates. Some use it as a term of endearment, while others problematize it, and some broaden its 
meaning while others employ it to describe a specific marker of identity such as ethnicity or 
religious group (2019, 484). 
A diaspora of a state or nation may not seem of much significance in a modern, globalized 
age – however, their importance has proliferated within the last thirty years. Over half of all UN 
member states have developed some type of formal governmental institution dedicated to their 
diaspora, with a surge in this trend beginning in 1990. Alonso credits this to a regrowth in 
optimism regarding the relationship between migration and development – as cash transfers from 
emigrants to the homeland, “expanded to outstrip overseas development aid, interest grew in the 
potential for policy makers to harness… the resources of emigrants and their descendants (2014, 
43).” In a broader sense, states use their diaspora engagement initiatives, according to Alonso, 
“…to help achieve an international ‘win-win-win’ outcome from migration, in which migrants 
exercise the freedom to move and benefit themselves materially (2014, 46).” The rise in diaspora 
prominence among states and their intergovernmental organizations has led to wider discussions 
on the topic, and, subsequently, challenges and modifications to the minutiae of the definition 
itself.  
There are multiple factors that influence whether origin states decide to engage with their 
diasporas. The characteristics of the diaspora as a whole are especially significant: how big is the 
diaspora population? Are they geographically dispersed, or concentrated in specific areas in 
which their proximity encourages actives engagement? Does the diaspora have the means to 
financially contribute to their origin state, and, furthermore, does the government have the 
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capacity to appeal to diaspora “elites” for investments? These are all aspects that an origin state 
will note when they consider the level of diasporic engagement. Other factors that influence state 
engagement of diasporas include the political nature of the regime in the origin country, as well 
as the role of the diaspora in its domestic or international affairs. The official and societal 
perceptions of emigration is also noteworthy: does the population look favorably upon the 
diaspora, or do they view them as disloyal? Is there a strong reliance on the emigrants’ economic 
investments and remittances? If so, states are much more likely to actively engage them to 
continue these transactions. 
There is limited analysis as to why the other half of states lack some sort of policy regarding 
their diaspora, and this presents a multitude of critiques on the literature regarding state and 
nation diasporas. Alonso notes that the literature on state-diaspora relations is mostly single case 
and qualitative studies. While this has allowed analysts to establish common and meaningful 
terminologies and typologies to categorize diasporas and policies, there is still a need for more 
study, especially with comparisons of policy. Delano specifically comments on the need for 
comparing the roles of both origin and destination contexts, the experiences of migrants and non-
migrants, and the experiences of groups included and excused in official conceptions of 
diasporas within the literature. Furthermore, more quantitative studies are necessary, however, 
this is difficult as data on diasporas and their policy is either unavailable or unsuitable for broad-
sample comparisons. Delano encourages a stronger influence of international norms, forums, and 
dialogues on migration and diaspora policies to remedy this issue, as they will proliferate and 




 External factors also play a significant role in determining level of diaspora engagement. 
In an increasingly normative world, international norms mediating aspects of the state-diaspora 
relationship guides origin homelands in their policies toward the diaspora. Over half of UN 
member states maintain a type of formal governmental institution dedicated to their diaspora. 
These initiatives can either reinforce or undermine the relationship between the government and 
its citizens in the homeland as domestic policies are projected beyond territorial borders, but the 
international image of the nation-state could face a negative response if they are passive about 
their entire community. Alexandra Alonso believes all of these factors are significant in 
determining activity between a diaspora population and their homeland. 
The relationships between state and diaspora are clear, but how do they differ from a nation 
and their diaspora? Many aspects between the two can clearly be shared, such as the idea of 
transnationalism. Alonso and Gamlen believe transnationalism is significant as it considers the 
“multiple ties and interactions linking people or institutions across the borders of nation-states,” 
and it is “especially common across East and Southeastern Europe where current national 
boundaries reinforce ‘national homogenization’ within former Soviet administrative boundaries 
that cut through ethnic groups…[this shows that] state recognition of diasporas does not 
necessarily imply state capacity to engage or protect them…by prioritizing some groups over 
others, it may also reproduce existing exclusions among race, class, or gender lines (2019, 47).” 
Alonso and Gamlen provide the example of Russia’s justification of their 2014 annexation of the 
Crimean Peninsula as they believe they have a responsibility to protect Russian “compatriots” 
wherever they live. To the authors, this reveals how many, “…enfranchising states have been not 
democracies but autocracies concerned about self-legitimation and surveillance of expatriate 
communities, rather than rights (2019, 48).” 
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The literature specifically regarding a unique relationship of stateless nations and their 
diaspora is sparse. The resource disparity between states and stateless nations is an additional 
factor to consider. States have the financial ability to implement diaspora engagement programs 
as well as international recognition and legitimate territorial authority that many stateless nations 
do not. This is because stateless nations may claim borders that are incongruent with those that 
are state-drawn and legitimate to other state actors. This complicates attempts at engagement as 
individuals that are a part of the diaspora may not officially claim that specific territory as part of 
their identity.  
In the case of Poland, political transitions to a more democratic society have erased negative 
relations between border region institutions such as churches and have positive relations with 
neighboring states such as Ukraine. Societal implementation of independence have formed a, 
“very specific basis for reshaping inter-ethnic relations” within and without Poland. Haase notes 
it could be argued that, “actors within official contracts [such as Poland and Ukraine] show a 
willingness to view past conflicts pragmatically and devote priority to establishing good-
neighborly relations, whereas at the local level there are still major obstacles to the normalization 
of inter-ethnic relations (2005, 221).” Indeed, the “Treaty between the Republic of Poland and 
Ukraine” declares that neither state has any intention to advocate for border changes, and refuse 
violence as a means to solve potential conflicts. This again contributes to the idea that states have 
a much less complicated experience in finding the legitimacy and resources to address their 
constituents compared to their stateless nation counterparts. 
While success of an engagement process between a stateless nation and their diaspora may 
seem unattainable, Delano and others that have contributed to diaspora literature have found that 
the objectives of “sub-state actors” can actually lead to more positive reactions from their target 
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populations. She argues that, “Informal arrangements of diaspora engagement are often more 
successful at reaching the intended population, particularly when there are weak governing 
structures at the state level (2014, 485).” While motivations of stateless nations and other “sub-
state actors” are often more meaningful to their diasporas, it will not matter if they do not have 
the resources to communicate effectively with their far-reaching populations in the first place. 
For example, transnational entities such as Euroregion’s are, “…hindered by a lack of financial 
support, acceptance, and transparency both within and without their larger states. In this vein, the 
potential to form a platform for ethnic and cultural dialogue is essentially unused (Haase, 2005, 
222).” However, if a stateless nation has the resources necessary to legitimately and positively 
connect to a state, then it may work to their benefit. Keating argues that external interactions are 
actually of importance to stateless nations in their quests to gain autonomy, as external policy for 
non-state governments serves to secure support for cultural development and legitimizes nation-
building as it places them in the wider family of nation-states or autonomous entities (2005, 
708).  
The United Nations, as well as other international organizations, have strongly advocated 
linking migration to the current international development agenda as they have strong 
implications in channeling developmental benefits of migration back to their origin states. In his 
survey, Ruben Ruiz-Rufino finds that having political parties that defend the interests of ethnic 
minority interests, including that of their diaspora, generated greater satisfaction than not having 
it. However, it is not enough for countries to provide the “bare minimum” – or, in other words, to 
simply provide political representation is that voice is ineffective in the larger government. Ruiz-
Rufino comments that, “…in Ukraine…none of the major legal texts regarding the elections of 
political participation even mention the existence of ethnic minority groups (2013, 104).”Having 
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an organization with the capacity for active mobilization, as well as means of acknowledging 
ethnic political demands, increases satisfaction with democracy (2013, 110). 
Overall, diaspora literature of stateless nations is lacking, and it can be implied, according to 
Delano, that much of this is due to typologies adopting a state-centric approach to their studies 
(2019, 486). While many factors clearly influence a stateless nation’s autonomy status, concrete 
literature regarding their successes or failures is overall absent. One thing is for certain: those 
who are a part of stateless nations, both in the homeland and the diaspora, maintain a strong 
sense of pride in their clearly unique culture and identity still exist and will continue to fight for 
established recognition and eventual self-rule.  
 
Political Opportunity Theory 
 Political opportunity theory, also known as political opportunity structure, is a theory-
based approach that argues that the success or failure of movements is influenced primarily by 
certain social factors. The theory assumes that success comes from openings within the political 
structure that increase the likelihood of goal achievement, rather than from social movements 
themselves (Zimmerman, 2015). Different scholars emphasize different aspects of the theory 
throughout the literature, but it almost always includes the degree of popular access to the 
political system, level of political repression, stability levels of elite members within the 
movement, and the presence of external allies in the homeland and diaspora (Tarrow 1989, 
Lichbach 1998). It is difficult for actors to anticipate a shift in the existing system that may 
create an opportunity for them to be successful, therefore, they must be equipped with short-term 
strategic calculations (Krisei, 1995). This is because political opportunity structure is based on 
resources that are “external” to the group – they are not driving the events that create the 
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opportunity but can merely react to them (and are more likely to be successful under a specific 
set of conditions). 
The degree of popular access to the political system is one aspect of political opportunity 
structure (POS). Are citizens educated on the current political situation in their territory? Do they 
have the resources to make ethical political decisions, or the freedom to partake in aspects of the 
political process? And furthermore, are they unsatisfied enough with the current political regime 
that they are willing to mobilize and encourage others to do the same? Vladislavjevic notes that, 
“…ordinary people in most periods lack resources to seriously contest the power of political 
elites and only changes in opportunities may reduce this imbalance of resources and trigger 
collective action (2002, 773).” All of these considerations are relevant to the degree of popular 
access to the political system and can change throughout time and place based on the amount of 
communication and technology available for those citizens to do so. 
Another factor to consider is the stability of political alignments within the system. 
“Political processes, institutions, and alignments thus set the context for the strategic interaction 
of a movement with its allies and opponents in civil society and the state (Lichbach, 1998, 88).” 
If political alignments are unstable, this creates a greater opportunity for social movements to 
make more of an impact. Elites within the system that are aligned with one another in their 
interests is another factor and be considerable in this case as they can provide organizational 
expertise or offer protection from repression. This is especially important in non-democratic 
states where ordinary people do not have access to the same resources (Vladislavjevic, 2002). 
These elites can also be a voice for the people and use their platform to mobilize them, whether it 
is to become more involved in their culture, the political process, and so on.  
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One critique of political opportunity structure is that it lacks in operationalization (Meyer 
2002). Critics have noted that there is a gap between the POS model and the reality of social 
movements because of its broad framework. The POS model has been countered most 
prominently with the collective action research program (CARP), a rationalist’s competing 
approach that collective endeavors often involve public good and Prisoner’s Dilemma elements, 
as well as predicting that less than five percent of supporters of a cause will actually become 
involved in it. These theorists also, “…recognize that groups always contain within-tradition 
conflicts which have major impacts on collective action…[and] the effects of the key operative 
and inoperative CA processes. This leads to the intended consequences of group mobilization: 
new institutions, policies, and programs desired by dissidents that help re-legitimize the social 
order (Lichbach, 1998).” While scholars have attempted to synthesize political opportunity 
structure and collective action research (Lichbach 1998), it is noted that there is a difference 
between structure and agency. 
Recently, there have been attempts to link political opportunity structure to ethnic 
mobilization. Hooghe (2005) analyzed this relationship with ethnic groups in Belgium and 
concluded that ethnic associations are currently too fragmented to be able to agree on a clear 
political agenda, or become a powerful political actor outside of concentrated urban areas such as 
Brussels. This study revealed that, “the literature on ethnic mobilization, and the research 
tradition on social movements, have largely ignored one another (988),” and that the application 







For this paper, I adopted Matsumoto’s definition of culture, which describes the term as, “the 
set of attitudes, values, beliefs, and behaviors shared by a group of people, but different for each 
individual, communicated from one generation to the next (1996, 16).” In this sense, culture is 
such as much an individual psychological construct as it is a social, group construct, as 
individual differences can be observed among people in the degree to which they adopt and 
engage in the attitudes, values, beliefs, and behaviors that, by consensus constitute their culture 
(1996, 18).” Cultural maintenance is simply the degree to which a certain group preserves and 
sustains its own culture. This can and must be done in several different ways.  
Language can be an important aspect of cultural maintenance. Some believe language to be 
the, “…most important element that defines a people, or that it is, in essence, the very 
embodiment of a people (Magocsi, 2005, 215).” Spoken language, the language taught in 
schools, and the language of publications encompass lifestyle and communication and is often 
passed down from generation to generation. Those who speak a language that is not the official 
language of the state or nation, or the majority language, may face a unique set of implications. 
For example, goals to insert these territorial economies, “…into the global trading order requires 
a command of state-wide and international languages. Language is thus an important factor in 
the minority-national /global interface (Keating, 1997, 701).” Not having a grasp of the majority 
language may stifle a group’s effort toward being legitimized in the world order, among other 
shortcomings. However, that is not every stateless nation or ethnic group’s goal. In his 
observation of Chechens of Jordan who speak Chechen among other members of their ethnic 
group, Dweik concluded that their positive attitude toward both their ethnic language and 
homeland allows them to view the language as a symbol of their identity and, in turn, strengthens 
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a sense of cultural maintenance. This is also bolstered by factors such as the existence of cultural 
islands and close neighborhoods, as well as the use of the language in the home and community 
from a young age (Dweik, 2000).  
Other literature focuses on the role language plays in the ethnic group. For the Malaysian 
Sindhis, the group does not feel that they require a language-based identity. Through the use of 
an extensive questionnaire, it is observed that their maintenance is rather based on other entities 
of culture such as religion, kinship and social ties, and awareness of a persecuted past 
(Khemlani-David, 1974). Analysis of ethnic minority groups in Australia show that other factors 
of culture such as a collectivist family orientation supported language maintenance for some 
groups, while others were more reliant on ethnic schools and other community structures 
(Hudson et. al., 2001). Each of these groups are comparable to the Rusyns in that they have been 
in existence for several centuries and have a distinct identity that is maintained in spite of being 
surrounded by other groups. These cases present the idea that language use or preservation is not 
necessary for strong cultural maintenance. However, this implication does not diminish the level 
of importance language can often possess among the members of a stateless nation or ethnic 
group, and this level of importance can shift over time. 
Language use and maintenance can differ for those in the diaspora, as subsequent generations 
can develop a duality in which they feel ethnically connected to both the country in which they 
were raised and the country from which their ancestors arrived. The Hungarian community in 
Queensland, Australia is shown to maintain high levels of traditional language use. Hungarians 
attach great value to their language and intergenerational language maintenance is bolstered by a 
strong sense of a Hungarian identity. Furthermore, the development of dual identities, or 
identifying as Australian and Hungarian, does not necessarily lead to language shift. This dual 
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identity can be an positive rather than a negative force in the development of bilingualism 
(Hatoss, 2003). In another research study, the Armenian diaspora in Lebanon was shown to have 
a decrease in ethnic language competence due to lack of exposure to the language. The data 
presented that while the older interviewees lamented this reality, the younger interviewees accept 
it as natural. Indeed, “…generational disparities in attitudes and perceptions demonstrate that 
along with the significant changes in the way different generations of Armenians grasp the 
meaning of…their ethno-cultural identity, there are also considerable differences regarding 
feelings of loyalty to their ancestral language, homeland, and heritage (Jebejian, 2007).” These 
contrasting studies present another instance of how language is viewed differently depending on 
the culture.  
Vehicles of cultural preservation are also essential in culture maintenance, and this includes 
aspects of culture such as education, strong cultural societies, functioning religious institutions, 
publications such as books and newspapers, and an overall sense of national organization among 
the community. This is not an exhaustive list of examples but all of these are certainly important 
in maintaining culture. Population diffusion is another important element of cultural maintenance 
because this can bolster or tarnish a sense of national organization. If a population is too diffused 
and doesn’t have adequate tools to communicate or are not regularly interacting with other 
members of their group, they are more likely to fall away from their people. In the sense of 
language, when people within a diaspora regularly use their ethnic language, generations can 
develop a duality in which they feel ethnically connected to both the country in which they were 
raised and the country from which their ancestors arrived. Regardless of identifying with 
diaspora or homeland in maintaining culture, remaining connected as a group is important in 
propelling the culture forward, and it can be done through these aspects. 
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This, like economies, can also differ depending on the border structure of the stateless nation. 
Stateless nations located within one state border can use a more consolidated approach to 
working with the larger state government to develop policies or institutions directed at the 
stateless nation community. If a stateless nation is spread across multiple state borders, each state 
may implement different policies or allocate different sums of finances toward cultural 
institutions and programs. This is clear in the case of the Rusyns, where certain states such as 
Slovakia view the Rusyns as a legitimate, distinct stateless nation group, while Ukrainians view 
their Rusyn population as a sub-ethnic group of Ukrainians and therefore do not engage with the 
populations to create a strong sense of cultural maintenance. Overall, are stateless nations with 
high levels of cultural maintenance more likely to be successful in their attempts to gain 
autonomy? Lichbach notes that cultural frames, “principally affect community solutions, such as 
common values, because culture defines preferences and beliefs (1998).” This, in addition to the 
evidence embedded in the literature regarding the topic, presents the idea that culture and 




 Stateless nations maintain economies which operate within the bounds of their state 
economy and the larger international economy; they are not separate entities. However, the 
specific cultural norms and values of the stateless nation can influence its economic functioning 
and output. This culture may also have economic effects by fostering collective identity, thereby 
facilitating the production of public goods. It may encourage the maintenance of collective 
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identity in the face of the international market (Keating, 1997, 701). This, in turn, influences a 
stateless nation’s push for autonomy.  
Keating argues that economic change and free trade undermine arguments against 
nationalism because it implies a lessened dependence on the state of which they are a part. This 
promotion of the “local” economy depends on the ability of the group to mobilize resources 
behind its development. For example, Quebec’s “Quebec Inc.” project was created in the 1960s 
as a coalition of government and business actors committed to expanding Quebec’s presence in 
the North American economy. However, in Scotland, local business ownership declined 
throughout the 20th century, leaving them increasingly dependent on British industrialization and 
policy. Scotland is also lacking in its own institutions of self-government, which limits their role 
(Keating, 706). A balance must be found in promotion of the group’s economy, as integration 
into the global economy would make them subject to costly trading rules, so it is clear that 
analyzing capacity of the group must be realistic. 
 There is little analysis of the impact of the economy on autonomy movements before the 
20th century. However, present autonomy movements may provide implications regarding factors 
of possible importance. Peitzker et. al. notes that European regions currently seeking autonomy 
are among the wealthiest in their respective states and outperform the national average in terms 
of per capita income. This is necessary because the undertaking of this movement is almost 
always accompanied by the risk of creating a weakened economy. However, “…these risks have 
decreased for smaller countries; paradoxically, this is especially due to European integration. 
After all, access to the single European market and the option of eurozone membership reduce 




Could this integration into the greater system be compared to state or regional integration 
into the industrial market in the 19th century? Considering that those states who were most 
industrialized were the most economically prosperous at this time, this may be a reasonable 
parallel to draw. However, Peitzker et. al. argue that even if the region was granted immediate 
membership of the single European market and the eurozone, there would be a number of 
potential financial disadvantages such as higher costs of borrowing, financial burdens from the 
assumption or distribution of “legacy debt,” and a disruption in trade (Peitzker et. al., 2015). The 
stateless nations that have succeeded in gaining any political leverage, “…tend to be 
economically or otherwise privileged, so they have tools to strengthen their political power, over 
and above their electoral weight (Hooghe, 2005, 986).”  
Furthermore, these successful economies of stateless nations, such as Quebec or modern 
European stateless nations, are often concentrated within one state border. Those stateless 
nations that possess a community transcending multiple state lines have a much more 
complicated operating procedure as they must work within the bounds of each of their states, 
who may not be willing to coordinate or cooperate for this population. Those who only operate 
under one state economy clearly have a much more consolidated system, which streamlines the 
path to success. The same cannot be said for those that do not have advanced levels of 
industrialization or trade as well as economic mobility under multiple state borders. It is clear 
that stateless nations must attempt to reach their goals through different procedures depending on 
their border structure. 
The aspects of political opportunity structure, cultural maintenance, and economic 
functioning all consistently interact to produce varying levels of success in a movement. The 
level of political legitimacy that a stateless nation can gain through the political opportunity 
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structure can influence how much they can improve their sense of culture or economic 
functioning. Strong economics can create political legitimacy or access to cultural improvements 
across the territory. Cultural maintenance can make a group feel more unified behind a common 
goal and can impact their pushes to strengthen their place in the political and economic realms. 
Each of these values are fluid and depend not only on the time and space, but external factors 
that may influence their impact. Each member of a group is affected by these three factors and 
their sub-factors. The three groups mainly examined in this thesis are the elites of the group, the 






Research Design and Case Selection 
 The purpose of this study is to assess the factors that have stifled the attempts of the 
Carpatho-Rusyn stateless nation in gaining political autonomy. I chose to study the Carpatho-
Rusyns because I myself am Rusyn. My mother’s ancestors emigrated to the United States from 
the Slovak village of Kamienka, and my father’s ancestors emigrated to the United States from 
the southern Poland and the northern Slovak village of Jarabina. I was raised in the Carpatho-
Rusyn Orthodox Church and celebrated my cultural heritage with my family and friends from a 
young age. While my personal connection was a motivating factor for me to choose this study, 
the Carpatho-Rusyns are also a vastly understudied group, which also motivated me to conduct 
research. Although they are located in the heart of Europe, they are largely unrecognized, 
especially to those outside of Europe. Their political plight throughout history is both similar to 
other groups and unique in its own ways. 
 This thesis employs a qualitative research design in order to examine the hypothesis. 
While it analyzes the Carpatho-Rusyn autonomy attempts through various factors, using a 
qualitative research design was the best fit for this thesis as it enabled me to draw subjective 
conclusions rather than attempt to make implications based on quantified evidence. I will assess 
the success the of autonomy attempts of the Carpatho-Rusyns through three factors, each with a 
number of subfactors. The first factor is political opportunity structure, which is evaluated 
through four sub-factors: degree of popular access to the political system, level of political 
repression, the stability of elite members of the movement, and the presence of external allies, all 
both in the homeland and the diaspora. The second factor is cultural maintenance, which is 
evaluated through the use of the ethnic language, vehicles of cultural preservation, and 
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population diffusion, all both in the homeland and the diaspora. The third and final factor is 
economic functioning, which is assessed through the local level of industrialization, trade with 
outsiders, and the potential for individual economic mobility. Because this thesis does employ a 
qualitative design and is more subjective, I use the sub-factors to create some level of 
standardization between all three time periods. These sub-factors are analyzed across time and 
space: in looking at each attempt, they are compared to other entities at that same period of time, 
and they are compared to the other two pushes for autonomy. I gathered information on these 
factors through extensive research. My knowledge of Carpatho-Rusyn history that informs much 
of this discussion could not have been possible without P.R. Magocsi, the leading expert and 
author in the Carpatho-Rusyn field. I was also assisted by other scholars on different aspects of 
the Rusyn nation as well as surrounding regions and groups.  
 One limitation of this study was that I cannot speak, read, or write Rusyn or many of the 
languages in which articles about them are written, such as Slovak, Polish, and Ukrainian. While 
I do have an intermediate level of proficiency in the Russian language, there were not many 
articles in Russian that were of relevance. Because of this, I could not reference perspectives not 
in English, which are arguably of importance because they are more likely to be of those 
experiencing a Rusyn lifestyle.  
The effects of COVID-19 were also a limitation of this study. I was most hindered by the 
cancellation of the Studium Carpato-Ruthenorum, a month-long summer program at the 
University of Prešov in Slovakia exclusively on Carpatho-Rusyn language, ethnography, and 
culture. Because of the cancellation, I was not able to personally or professionally connect with 
many of the leading experts in the field who teach at the Ruthernorum, as well as interact with 
the authentic, living Rusyn culture in Eastern Europe. In addition to this cancellation, I was 
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hindered by the cancellation of in-person university classes, which would have given me more 
opportunities to connect with my professors and fellow honors capstone peers about the thesis. 
Although I still had virtual access to these individuals, meetings were less frequent compared to 
the first two semesters of the project. Nevertheless, I was still able to gain valuable insight from 
each of them as well as all of the scholarly articles to which I had access.  
 A final limitation within my study is that the available range of literature on Carpatho-
Rusyns is minimal. It was incredibly difficult to locate articles of a scholarly nature on Carpatho-
Rusyns that would allow me to consult varying perspectives on the region. Those articles and 
books that I was able to use were extremely helpful in terms of helping me to learn more about 
the history and culture of Rusyns, and this is clear throughout the thesis as these authors are cited 
many times. This thesis may have been able to be more comprehensive if the available literature 
was not lacking in terms of critical analysis, differing perspective, and also scholarly.  
 My hypothesis is that stateless nations that maintain high levels of cultural maintenance, 
economic functioning, and facets of the political opportunity structure are more likely to be 
successful in their attempts to gain autonomy than those stateless nations that do not. My 
independent variables are the factors of political opportunity structure, economic prosperity, and 
cultural maintenance and their sub-factors. My dependent variable is the level of autonomy. The 
chart below (Table 1) provides a succinct overview of each of the sub-factors during the period 








-degree of popular access to 
political system: low  
-level of political repression: 
moderate 
-stable elites: moderate 
-presence of elite external 
allies: low 
-degree of popular access to 
political system: moderate 
   -more in diaspora, less in 
homeland 
-level of political repression: 
moderate 
-stable elites: high 
-presence of elite external allies: 
high 
-degree of popular access to 
political system: high 
-political repression: moderate 
   -more in homeland, less in 
diaspora 
-stable elites: high 




-language spoken: yes  




-language spoken: yes 
-vehicles of cultural preservation: 
high 
-diaspora/diffused population: yes 
-language spoken: somewhat 






-industrialized local economy: 
no 
trade with outsiders: no 
-individual economic 
mobility: low 
-industrialized local economy: 
moderate 
-trade with outsiders: no 
-individual economic mobility: 
moderate 
   -more in diaspora, less in 
homeland 
 
-industrialized local economy: 
moderate 
-trade with outsiders: no 
-individual economic 
mobility: moderate 




No success in gaining 
autonomy. 
   However, movement was a 
catalyst for elites to develop 
vehicles of cultural 
maintenance that would 
strengthen the next movement. 
 
Qualified success in gaining 
autonomy. 
    Not granted desired level of 
autonomy until state government 
was weakened by Nazi Germany 
– and the system was short-lived 
due to the onset of World War II. 
No success in gaining 
autonomy. 
    State government would not 
acknowledge the legitimacy of 
the vote for autonomy 
although it took place in a 






Failure to Achieve Autonomy: 1848-1850 
Political opportunity structure 
 Degree of popular access to political system: low 
 Level of political repression: moderate  
Stability within elites: high 
 Presence of elite external allies: low 
Cultural maintenance 
 Language spoken across homeland: yes  
Clear vehicles of cultural preservation: no 
 Diaspora/diffused population: no 
Economic functioning 
 Industrialized local economy: no 
 Economic mobility: low 
 Trade with external entities: no 
Success in achieving autonomy?: no 
  
The Revolutions of 1848 were the first clear opportunity for Carpatho-Rusyns to gain 
political autonomy as ethnic minorities rejected the supremacy of the Habsburg Empire and 
pushed to carry out the agendas of their own peoples after decades of increasing nationalism. 
Leaders across the region convened at the Slavic Congress of 1848 to assert their claims to 
nationality under Habsburg rule. At this time, Rusyns existing in the province of Galicia, a 
Habsburg-controlled Polish region where Lemkos (as well as other ethnic populations like Poles 
and Jews) resided, were the only Rusyns to be represented at the council. The Rusyn Sobor and 
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the Supreme Ruthenian Council had the goal of supporting a Russian orientation to preserve their 
nationality, but others at the Congress, such as the Poles, felt threatened by this prospect. The 
Rusyn delegates countered this with demands to divide Galicia into an eastern, Rusyn half, and a 
western, Polish half. This was rejected and resulted in a Polish-Rusyn compromise that, 
“…stipulated that Galicia would remain undivided [in terms of nationality] until appropriate 
decisions were taken by the local Diet, both nations having equal rights, especially language-
wise; the official language in regional offices and schools would be one spoken by the majority 
of inhabitants of that region (New World Encyclopedia).” Though this was not a direct petition 
to the Habsburg Empire regarding autonomy, the compromise proves that Rusyns had a stake in 
the politics of the region as a distinct group.  
Elsewhere, other political leaders simultaneously aimed to maintain Rusyn culture through 
language preservation. Adolf Dobrians’kyi, a mining engineer from central Slovakia, also 
participated in the Slavic Congress of 1848 and became a “political leader” for Rusyns 
throughout the region as a whole. Dobrians’kyi worked with activists in Prešov to create a 
memorandum outlining a distinct “Rusyn crownland” in which Rusyns of Hungary, Galicia, and 
Bukovina would be united. Although this was rejected, Dobrians’kyi was able to secure a 
position as civil commissar and use his influence to submit a second petition ten months later in 
October of 1849. This petition was signed by thirteen Rusyn civic activists, and while it left out 
demands to unite with those in Galicia and Bukovina, it did include requests to introduce the 
Rusyn language into schools, governments, and public signs within the administrative unit 
(Magocsi, 121-23, 2005). The Austrian imperial government did approve the demands of 
Dobrians’kyi and appointed him as administrator of the new Uzhhorod District. However, the 
entity only lasted from October 1849 to March of 1850. While this district only lasted for several 
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months, “its very existence implanted in the mindset of local civic and cultural activists the view 
that Carpatho-Rusyns were a distinct people deserving of autonomy (Magocsi, 2015, 580).” 
 
Political Opportunity Structure 
The developments in 1848 were significant in terms of political representation for Rusyns 
and contributed to their first push for autonomy. Although the initial goal of orienting themselves 
with Russia and dividing Galicia was not fulfilled at the Slavic Congress of 1848, it showed that 
Rusyn leaders were coordinating to carry out political aims and could legitimately advocate for 
themselves on a state level. In fact, it is claimed that petitions were created and signed by 
individuals throughout the region for the division of Galicia. The exact number of signatures is 
unknown, and scholars admit that the manner in which the petition was recorded by 
contemporaries was “ambivalent” as many of the forms contain no more than long lists of names, 
or a cross instead of a signature as many did not yet know how to read or write. While the 
Galician population mostly contained peasants with a low level of literacy, which was enough to 
put the significance of the petition in favor of partition into doubt, these claims still present the 
possibility of some level of political mobilization across the general populace (Osterkamp, 
2016). 
The compromise also allowed Lemko Rusyns in Galicia to preserve their language, one of 
the most prevalent manifestations of culture and clear indicators of a distinct nationality, within 
their region. It also protected their right to speak, teach, and publish the language. These initial 
developments regarding language standardization paved the way for improvements even at the 
local level, as those who held political office in regions such as Galicia were able to allot funding 
for Rusyns and enabled them to create entities such as, “…political parties, civic organizations, 
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cultural societies, and a wide range of newspapers and other publications (Magocsi, 2005, 132).” 
This shows the clear interconnectivity of culture and political goals. 
Magocsi reflects that even though Carpatho-Rusyns achieved significance in their short-lived 
autonomous territory, this only, “…made an impression and remained in the collective 
consciousness of educated Carpatho-Rusyn society (2005, 127).” Other, “ordinary” Rusyns were 
overall lacking in terms of the degree of popular access to the political system. Throughout the 
19th century, the majority of Rusyns lacked the knowledge required to legitimately become part 
of the political process for autonomy or even understand what was at stake. However, it was this 
same point when a clear sense of identity crystalized for the elites within their community, and 
those individuals responded to this by creating works that diffused throughout the region over the 
next several decades and helped Rusyns reach a greater level of success in their second major 
push for autonomy. These high levels of unity among the elite members of Rusyn society played 
a major role in the extent of the group’s success. For example, Dobrians’kyi had support from 
Slovak local and national activists, the Greek Catholic Bishop of Prešov, and the Supreme Rusyn 
Council in his memorandum to Emperor Franz Joseph (Magocsi, 121, 2005).  This was the first 
significant instance of Rusyns from multiple districts coming together to achieve a set of 
common goals based on their sense of nationality. 
This coordination can be juxtaposed with the vulnerability of the existing political system, 
another factor of political opportunity structure which played a role in success. These elites, 
especially Dobrians’kyi, “…entered public life at a time when their Hungarian rulers were 
completely subordinated to Vienna and at a time when the Austrian imperial government felt it 
advantageous…to give token support and encouragement to…peoples within their realm 
[including Carpatho Rusyns] (Magocsi, 128, 2005).” Furthermore, the “Spring of Nations” 
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promoted national awakenings across the European continent and weakened the monarchy’s hold 
on their subjects. However, there was little to no presence of elite allies on a state or monarchy 
level that advocated for the Rusyns, which is where the group fell short. While many Habsburg 
leaders advocated for Rusyn freedoms within their own kingdom, they were unwilling to end its 
territorial unity.  
 
Cultural Maintenance 
Overall, low levels of cultural maintenance during 1848 contributed to the short-lived, 
disunified autonomous region of 1849. Most spoke some dialect of Rusyn, which was culturally 
significant (Magocsi, Rusinko), and the population was hardly diffused as motivations for 
emigration had not yet appeared.  At the same time, Rusyns did not yet create tangible 
institutions for promotion of their distinct cultural identity, and most lived in small isolated 
villages that did not allow for communication among average Rusyn communities. Magocsi 
describes the cultural base of the Rusyns as “rudimentary” during this time period (2005). 
Rusinko argues that there were four major factors that halted Rusyns from reaching full 
autonomy in regards to culture development: inadequacy of education, lack of national 
organization, paucity of books, and scarcity of nationally minded individuals (2003).  
Rusyns did possess two influential political and cultural leaders that ignited cultural 
developments, both shortly after the Spring of Nations and over the next several decades. 
Dobrians’kyi worked closely with the Greek Catholic priest Aleksander Dukhnovych to promote 
a distinct Rusyn identity to those of a lower socioeconomic class. Dukhnovych published school 
textbooks on Rusyn language and grammar and established a literary society that sponsored 
several publications, each encompassing different forms of text such as literature, poems, and 
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plays. Dukhnovych was a Russophile, which meant that he considered Rusyns to be a branch of 
the Russian nationality, but used Rusyn as the standard language in his writing, therefore making 
his ideas more accessible to the population within the region. At this point, many still could not 
read or write at an advanced level and had never formally studied the Rusyn language, but 
Dukhnovych’s works were intended for, “schoolchildren and semi-literate peasants (Magocsi, 
2005, 125).” Dukhnovych worked individuals who represented different identities within the 
Rusyn population, among them priests, student, and even women. It is noted that, “Their literary 
sophistication and artistic technique were uneven, but they were united by patriotic and poetic 
enthusiasm, and in this respect, their work fulfilled Dukhnovych's goal of manifesting the soul of 
the Rusyn people (Rusinko, 1999).”  
Furthermore, closer analysis of Dukhnovych’s literary work reveals that he understood the 
“liminal” nature of Rusyn culture, but also that it was still essential to create external 
relationships for the nation’s survival (Rusinko, 1999).  The efforts of Dobrians’kyi and 
Dukhnovych presents the interconnected nature of politics and culture. Through their literary 
works, Dobrians’kyi and Dukhnovych were able to simultaneously create high levels of cultural 
maintenance among the population and the foundations of political mobilization that would 
continuously increase in the next several decades. These eventually led to entities such as village 
reading rooms, and bursas, self-governing educational and cultural societies aimed at promoting 
Rusyn culture, which were particularly formative for young people. While all of these were 
vehicles through which Rusyns were encouraged to maintain a distinct identity, these developed 
too late to make an impact on the autonomy movement of 1848 – rather, the movement itself was 





Many Rusyns lived simple lifestyles as farmers or herders due to the isolated, rural areas 
in which they resided. Rusyns remained serfs to Hungarian and Polish landlords until 1848 due 
to their ethnic minority status. Even after their liberation from serfdom, this status allowed little 
economic mobility, and as a result, most remained agricultural workers to the same landlords for 
many more years. Much of their plight was also dependent on topography – those who lived in 
high, arid mountain villages were more prone to conditions of poverty as a result of subsistence-
level farming and consistent poor harvests. In contrast, those who lived in the foothills of the 
mountains were able to both experience better climate conditions and more versatile agricultural 
technologies (Magocsi, 2005).  
Similar to cultural maintenance, low levels of economic prosperity hurt the Rusyns in 
their attempt to gain autonomy. Regardless of location, Rusyns serfs were emancipated just a few 
months before Dobrians’kyi made an individual push for autonomy, which gave them no time to 
rise in socioeconomic class status. In addition, the regions in which Rusyns lived were still 
unindustrialized at this time. Their rural lifestyles could not compete with regions elsewhere in 
Europe, and no elite members of the Rusyn community possessed the economic influence to 
garner expensive resources for the movement. Furthermore, Rusyns were not interacting with 
other regions in terms of trade. All of these factors combine to display that the Rusyn economy 
did not contribute, and in fact, may have hurt, the group’s push for autonomy in 1848.  
Overall, the Rusyns failed to gain autonomy during this time. They had low values of 
each factor and their subfactors. While a consolidated population who spoke the same language 
was significant in that they were connected under the same larger powers, elite, educated Rusyns 
were the only group within this population to have clear goals to reach autonomy. The failure to 
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gain autonomy in 1848 does not negate the amount of progress that they made in such a short 
amount of time, however. The movement ignited the first instance of significant movement 
toward cultural consolidation and inspired many Rusyns to become involved in local politics. 
Rusinko mentions that the many successes that the Rusyns made during this period need to, 
“…be judged today in the context of a century’s experience of national cultural liberation (2003, 
112).” It is clear that the movement was a failure in the sense of reaching the end goal as Rusyns 
did not attain their immediate goal of autonomy, but it did act as a catalyst as the group instead 
made long-term developments over the next several decades that set them up for a stronger push 





Qualified Success in the Interwar Period 
Political opportunity structure 
 Degree of popular access to political system: moderate 
 Stability or elites: high 
 Presence of allies: high 
 Level of political repression: moderate 
Cultural maintenance 
 Vehicles of cultural preservation: high 
 Language spoken: yes 
 Diaspora/diffused population: yes 
Economic functioning 
 Individual economic mobility: moderate 
 Trade with external entities: no 
 Level of industrialization: moderate 
Success in achieving autonomy?: yes 
 
Throughout World War I, Carpatho-Rusyns in the homeland and the diaspora closely 
followed military and political developments, which allowed them to organize their political 
activity and eventually petition for autonomy when it was over. This was another instance of 
political opportunity that the Rusyns faced – only this time, they were prepared to act on it as a 
unit.  
At the same time, the government of Budapest created Rus’ ka Kraina, an autonomous entity 
within Hungarian borders in an effort to retain Rusyn-inhabited lands within Hungary, desperate 
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to retain the borders of the prewar kingdom (Kupensky, 2019). Current literature agrees that “the 
Rus Land” was compiled to transform the republic into a Bolshevik-ruled entity as the leaders of 
the new independent republic of Hungary feared for lack of legitimacy and punishment after 
defeat in World War I. The territory included land in both present-day Slovakia and Ukraine and 
would be comprised of five counties (Magocsi, 2015, 581). Rus’ ka Kraina was nonetheless 
created, but did not become the territory for the majority of Rusyns. 
 At the same time, the Czechoslovak countered the Hungarian’s offer to the Rusyns with 
Ruskinko: a similarly autonomous Rusyn entity within the borders of Czechoslovakia if they 
would join them in their new state. Through his connections as a legal representative for General 
Motors, Rusyn-American advocate Gregory Zhatkovych was able to secure a meeting with 
United States President Woodrow Wilson to discuss Rusyn aspirations in 1918. Zhatkovych’s 
initial proposal to President Wilson was a memorandum that suggested the creation of a 
completely independent Carpatho-Rusyn state. While Wilson rejected this proposal, he did agree 
to the establishment of an autonomous entity within the newly formed Czechoslovakia. News of 
this “Scranton Resolution” spread among the Rusyn-American community, who eventually had 
the opportunity to indirectly vote for this plan through delegates of their leading brotherhood 
organizations, and received 68% of the vote. Even more exciting was the initial cooperation of 
newly installed Czechoslovak President Tomas Masaryk, who was actually the individual to 
suggest the referendum be held.  
In the end, the Rusyn people chose the Czechoslovak option after meeting at the Central 
Rusyn National Council in May of 1919 (Magocsi, 2015, 581). This autonomous territory would 
not encompass all of Carpatho-Rus’, which was why leaders around the region were also 
coordinating, establishing numerous national councils that influenced and informed each other 
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throughout the peacemaking processes of post-World War I. A majority of Rusyn-Americans as 
well as local leaders in the Old Country were extremely satisfied with this new Rusyn province 
in the state as they expected it to soon become a “third state” within Czechoslovakia. 
This newly established Carpatho-Rusyn region within Czechoslovakia was the most decisive 
for the community as up to 70% of Rusyns in the homeland were citizens there. Furthermore, it 
is clear that, “The expectation was that Carpatho-Rusyns would receive full autonomy in a 
Czechoslovak federation (Magocsi, 2005, 178).” At this time, Carpatho-Rusyns were confident 
that they had the organization and determination required to maintain any autonomous political 
entity – but, as before, larger powers had other intentions. As more and more time passed from 
the decision that made in 1918, the Czechoslovak government eventually decided that Rusyns 
were not “politically mature” enough to effectively maintain their own government and transition 
from provisional to autonomous. The reality in Subcarpathian Rus’ was such a contrast from 
what was originally promised that Zhatkovych resigned from his position as governor of the 
region less than one year later.  
Perhaps much of Zhatkovych’s frustration stemmed from his experience in the American 
political system, as when he initially made agreements with President Wilson and President 
Masaryk, he assumed that Subcarpathian Rus’ would be comparable to a state within the United 
States. However, it was never specified that the region required its own representative 
government and governor. Instead, it was directed by a Czech vice-governor who was always 
appointed by the central government in Prague. Even when the administrative structure of the 
Czechoslovak government was revised almost a decade later in 1928, governors of the region, 
just as Zhatkovych before them, were not much more than figureheads (Magocsi, 2005). This 
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was particularly frustrating to leaders both within the region and those in the United States as 
they felt fully capable of administering Subcarpathian Rus’.  
Those within Subcarpathian Rus’ enjoyed many freedoms, yet still pushed for their promised 
autonomy, throughout the interwar period. This came to a head at the end of 1938. Magocsi 
describes that, “In the wake of the Munich Pact and a weakened Czechoslovakia, the central 
government in Prague conceded to demands of the leaders…(2005, 271).” Subcarpathian Rus’ 
proceeded to endure a tumultuous five months filled with constant exchanges of power, threats 
of violence, and conflicting interests. This began when Subcarpathian Rus’ was granted an 
autonomous government, but this endeavor only lasted two weeks after the frustrated Premier 
Andrei Brodii attempted to annex the region into Hungary and was subsequently dismissed along 
with the rest of the cabinet. A week after new Premier Avhustyn Voloshyn was installed, the 
agreements of the new Vienna Award cut off Subcarpathian Rus’ administrative centers and two 
largest cities from the rest of the region’s inhabitants. As a result of this, Hungary attacked 
Subcarpathian Rus’ multiple times in an attempt to destabilize international boundaries that 
frustrated them during the interwar period (Magocsi, 2005). 
Weakened by both physical and cultural attacks and faced with inevitable occupation by 
Hungary, the Subcarpathian Rus’ government symbolically declared their independence as the 
state of Carpatho- Ukraine one day before it was overtaken by the Hungarian Army. Carpatho-
Rusyns would go on to be broken up under multiple states during World War II and after 






Political Opportunity Structure 
Magocsi writes that, “Even when it was clear that their permanent home really was to be the 
United States, the Old-World experience with politics in which the fate of Carpatho-Rusyns was 
usually decided by others led many of them to maintain a negative and pessimistic view of the 
political process (2005, 83).” This, coupled with lack of education and representation, meant that 
there was no true advocate for the rights and advancement of Rusyns and other Slavic minorities, 
with whom they were often lumped together, in the United States. This is why Rusyns turned to 
the politics of their homeland. It is noted that after World War I and throughout the interwar 
period, Rusyns gained a sudden political self-confidence and had no desire to fall back on the 
politics of other nationalities, but rather, were motivated to further their own interests (Fedinec, 
2011). The degree of popular access to the political system was significantly increased during 
this period of time, especially in the diaspora. This is made clear in those who emigrated to the 
United States and created communities, and eventually, formed churches and fraternal societies.  
These organizations enabled diasporic Rusyns to still have popular access to the political 
system and events impacting their homeland. This was done through things such as collecting 
money for those affected by World War I in the “Old Country,” or publicizing accounts of their 
struggles for other Rusyn-Americans to consume. Many also joined industrial or labor unions 
because of their work in steel mills or coal mines, and it was here that a sense of class-
consciousness, social and ethnic solidarity, and national awareness grew (Silvestri, The 
Medium). All of these vehicles engaged Rusyn-Americans in the popular political process and 




While the sheer percentage of involvement was significant, the presence of elite Rusyns who 
advocated for autonomy played an equally important role. The American National Council of 
Uhro-Rusins were other Rusyn-American political elites that united the many smaller 
associations and societies in the summer of 1918. This council actually engaged the Rusyn-
American populace in their political workings by voting, as their representatives, regarding 
President Wilson’s plan for Rusyn autonomy within Czechoslovakia. This was a clear marker of 
political organization and coordination among Rusyn national organizations. The American 
National Council of Uhro-Rusins also appointed Gregory Zatkovich as their face of the 
movement. Zatkovich was not only young, charismatic, and well-connected, but made tangible 
political strides for Rusyns immediately following World War I – after meeting with President 
Woodrow Wilson, he led a delegation at the Paris Peace Conference and was able to secure the 
“Czechoslovak solution.” These convenings also display the presence of elite external allies that 
Rusyns had gained. Zatkovich’s advocacy work was significant as it was on an international, 
intergovernmental stage. It was because of his work that Zatkovich was appointed to be the first 
governor of Subcarpathian Rus’ in 1920.  
The amount of popular political involvement in the diaspora is a contrast to those in the 
homeland at the beginning of the movement. It is noted that, “At that time, the vast majority of 
Ruthenians were peasants and transhumant pastoralists, still more attached to their localities and 
Orthodox Christianity than to the concept that they constitute a separate nation (Kamusella, 
2009).” With shifting state borders after World War I (and eventually World War II), level of 
political repression or freedom was often unclear to the average Rusyn in the homeland. Those in 
the diaspora were aware of their freedoms as Rusyn-Americans which enabled them to actively 
advocate for autonomy. Overall, the sheer process of working with elites on an international 
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scale reflects how greatly the political opportunity structure subfactors grew in value compared 
to that of 1848.   
 
Cultural Maintenance 
There are several markers of a clear, organized, and living ethnicity within Subcarpathian 
Rus’ that developed during the interwar period which assisted in strides to gain autonomy prior 
to World War II. This was, in large part, made possible by the new, “liberal” Czechoslovak 
government, which invested an abundant amount of funds into the infrastructure and progressive 
agencies within Subcarpathian Rus’ and creating a feeling of a cultural renaissance among its 
inhabitants. The central government allowed the region of Subcarpathian Rus’ to maintain an 
official language, a national anthem, and a coat of arms.  
The Czechoslovak government also worked to improve the education system within the 
region due to their perspective on the “backwards” Slavs by dramatically increasing the amount 
of school systems. These school systems were for both children and adults and many students 
were taught using the Rusyn language. Reading rooms, now called Prosvita organizations, 
continued to expand, which enabled grassroots cultural maintenance. These organizations housed 
access to books and newspapers and lectures could also be heard. Both schools and bursas are 
dually important as they were enduring institutions, and proliferated and legitimized the use of 
the Rusyn language. The Rusyn intelligista, “…for the first time enjoyed relative freedom to 
work out their identity and construct their own national narrative….writers and activists 
produced a voluminous literature, including journals, polemics, critical studies, and belles lettres 
(Rusinko, 2003, 296).” The creation of group entities like football teams and theater groups 
bolstered national pride (Magocsi, 2005). The use of sacral art also increased and became 
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especially sophisticated during this time period. All of these developments provided an 
opportunity for Rusyns to engage in and celebrate their distinct culture. 
The democratic nature of the Czechoslovak regime actually led to other aspects of culture, 
such as religion, to be challenged. This new sense of freedom sparked a “return to Orthodoxy” 
movement across Subcarpathia Rus’, even at the local village level. The Greek Catholic Church 
responded with a missionary campaign across the region, and the number of converts decreased 
(Magocsi, 2005, 212). These conversions reflect a larger question of identity and national 
orientation – those who returned to Orthodoxy preferred a Russian national orientation, in 
response to the Greek Catholic Church, which maintained pro-Hungary aspects in its structures 
but later adopted a purely Rusyn national orientation. This also shows that while more 
democracy and recognition allowed those in the homeland to create flourishing cultural 
structures, that freedom could also lead to divides and disunity. 
Those in the diaspora grappled with their cultural identity once emigrating to the United 
States. It is evident that many Rusyns found it difficult to maintain their culture as, “…before 
WWI, the only independent Slavic state of any significance [to the average American] was 
Russia. Thus, since the Carpathian East Slavs used the terms Rus, Rusyn, Rusnak, Ruska, … [it 
was simpler to] say you were ‘Russian’ when asked nationality and leave it at that (Best, 2013, 
11).” A clearest sense of identity was found in quickly assimilating to American culture or 
finding small, niche communities within religious institutions (Best, 2013, 10). Becoming a 
member of a Greek Catholic or Orthodox church was one of the only ways in which Rusyn-
Americans maintained their cultural identity during this time. Because many immigrants 
believed that they would eventually return back to the homeland one day, there was no 
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significant push to create distinctly Rusyn cultural institutions within the United States during 
this time.  
However, Magocsi expresses the Rusyn political connection as always having a, “…special 
connotation. It has generally not meant participation in the American political system, but rather 
refers to a concern with the fate of the homeland, to endless debates about the problem of ethnic 
or national self-identity…(1993, 83).” Rusyns did stay connected to their homeland, but it was 
mostly in a political way. It is also important to note that the United States government was not 
funding Rusyn-Americans to create vehicles of cultural preservation as Rusyns in the homeland 
were. Where Rusyns in the diaspora lacked in cultural maintenance compared to that of their 
homeland, they made up for it in political activism, and vice versa. 
 
Economy 
In emigrating to the United States, most Rusyns who did so believed that their stay in the 
United States would be short-term –  their goal was to make money to later return home and 
provide a more comfortable lifestyle for their family there. Most Rusyns settled in industrial 
cities in the Northeast such as New York City, Pittsburgh, and Detroit, but low pay and long 
hours in factory jobs meant that many young Rusyn immigrants faced the reality of staying 
longer than they originally intended. While the average Rusyn did not become extremely wealthy 
after emigrating to the United States, they certainly felt they had a greater level of economic 
mobility compared to the homeland as there was a larger range of work opportunities in the 
community around them. Furthermore, Rusyn-Americans invested much of their earned money 
into building cultural and political institutions such as new churches and fraternal society 
buildings. They also were able to send money back to their family in the homeland (or even 
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physically go back and forth between Carpatho-Rus’ and the United States and bring it with 
them), and many families grew to rely on these finances as a substantial source of their income.  
In the homeland, Rusyns again lacked group elites that could provide necessary finances 
to assist in garnering resources for their autonomy movement. They also continued to lack in 
trading with outside entities. While the political autonomy for which they petitioned did not 
require a completely independent economic system from the state to which they were attached, 
semi-independence would require strong, self-sufficient economic institutions.  
However, the Czechoslovak government did invest a massive amount of funds into 
Subcarpathian Rus’ during the interwar period which improved their overall economy. While 
83% of Rusyns were still employed in agricultural or forest-related jobs in 1930, Prague was 
determined to transform the capital city of Uzhhorod into a prosperous cultural and economic 
center. In urban areas such as these, the government created architectural structures that were not 
only completely new to the region but still function to this day. In rural areas, Czechoslovak 
governmental agencies brought new cultivation methods, improved crop stains, and educational 
assistance on farming to the communities there. Furthermore, a land reform contributed to the 
dissolution of large land estates previously owned by Hungarian nobility, which allowed for 
those in the area to purchase more land (Magocsi, 2005, 204). These vehicles of economic 
improvement were not a collaborative effort between the Rusyn government and the central 
entity in Prague – they were imposed on a state level. However, this presents that the government 
was willing to provide resources to Subcarpathian Rus’ even though they would no longer allow 
them to become an autonomous entity.  
The interwar period was arguably the most opportune time for Carpatho-Rusyns to reach 
their goal of autonomy, and for short amounts of time during these years, they reached that goal 
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– however, it was always under threat from a more powerful entity and was eventually taken 
away again. It is clear that Rusyns had some level of qualified success during this time, as 
Rusyns did eventually receive their desired autonomy in the late 1930s, but it wasn’t willingly 
offered – it was because Czechoslovakia was weakened by Nazi Germany and felt pressured to 
make changes in an effort to preserve some sense of freedom. It is possible that this autonomous 
state may have endured if World War II had not happened, or even if the onset was later, giving 
Rusyns more time to create stability and organization. Regardless, Rusyns made great progress 
during the interwar period. It is clear that their engagement with the political opportunity 
structure factor propelled the movement into legitimacy and allowed them to then strengthen 
their sense of cultural maintenance and economic functioning during this time, as values of these 
factors also increased. Yet, the Rusyns lacked the stability to endure as an autonomous entity 






Second Failure to Achieve Autonomy: 1991 
 
Political opportunity structure 
 Degree of popular access to political system: moderate 
 Stability within elites: high 
 Presence of allies: yes 
 Level of political repression: low 
Cultural maintenance: weak 
 Vehicles of cultural preservation: no 
 Language spoken across homeland: no 
 Diaspora/diffused population: yes 
Economic functioning: weak  
Industrialized local economy: moderate 
Individual economic mobility: moderate 
Trade with external entities: no 
Success in achieving autonomy?: no 
 
The dissolution of the Soviet Union in the early 1990s prompted a continental resurgence of 
nationalism, and Carpatho-Rusyns were not exempt. Increases in globalization and education 
also assisted Rusyns in being realistic about their aspirations. The breakup of the Soviet Union 
created the opportunity for new states to form, but Rusyns knew that this was unlikely for them. 
Once again, the ethnicity looked to gain a politically autonomous region for their people. A 
World Congress of Rusyns was held in 1991 and When Ukraine’s parliament held its national 
referendum to declare independence, they also asked whether Transcarpathia (Ukrainian: 
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Zakkarpatia), a region that was home to a majority of Rusyns at the time, should be given status 
of a self-governing administrative territory (autonomy) within Ukraine (similar to Ukraine’s 
Crimea region).  78% of those who voted, voted in favor of this self-government. Even though 
this question was on the same ballot as the question of Ukrainian independence, and that was 
passed, the Ukrainian parliament later refused to accept the results of the Transcarpathia vote. 
Sixteen years after the 1991 referendum regarding Transcarpathian autonomy had passed and 
went ignored by Ukrainian government officials, an organization named the Diet of 
Subcarpathian Rus’ proclaimed its intention to declare the region as an autonomous one 
regardless of Ukraine’s approval. This organization additionally called on those within the 
European Union and the Russian Federation to guarantee a favorable resolution, which was 
strongly criticized by pro-Rusyn activists as well as the World Congress of Rusyns as the 
petition to the Russian Federation was “hardly an appropriate model for Carpatho-Rusyns or any 
people in Europe (Magocsi 2008).” While the petitions were somewhat extreme, they garnered 
international attention which made it impossible for the otherwise passive Ukrainian government 
to ignore. In 2007, the Transcarpathian Regional government passed a resolution that recognized 
Rusyns as a nationality on the territory of the Transcarpathian oblast (Magocsi 2019). The 
national Ukrainian government did not follow Transcarpathia in doing so. The Ukrainian 
legislative system does not have the authority to decide on the existence of a nation – the 
country’s interior law declares that every person belonging to a national minority has the right of 
free identification (Law on National Minorities in Ukraine). In 2012, Dymytrii Sydor, the head 






Political Opportunity Structure 
The first World Congress of Rusyns was held in early 1991 and was a major promotion of 
intergroup cooperation as it allowed Rusyn groups to streamline and agree on their goals as an 
ethnic minority. Its meeting legitimized the existence of Carpatho-Rusyns for many, and states 
such as Czechoslovakia and the United States recognized Rusyns as an official ethnic group. 
This was a significant first step toward reaching political autonomy. The Rusyns at the Congress 
were strongly inclined to creating autonomy for themselves as they argued they were the 
indigenous majority population of the region and felt they had legal precedence to establish what 
they wanted due to its status before World War II and the Soviet Union.  
Leaders within the Rusyn community were hopeful after the Ukrainian referendum, as a clear 
majority of people within the state supported at least some level of autonomy. There was little 
movement after the vote took place. Eventually, Ukrainian President Kravchuk was confronted 
with requests as to why his promise hadn’t come to fruition yet. The blame was placed on 
Ukraine’s national parliament and their authority regarding the matter (Magocsi, 2005). Activists 
in both Eastern Europe and abroad responded to this with protests and activism, but it made a 
minimal impact as Ukraine’s 1996 constitution adopted a centralized state structure. 
Transcarpathia was granted an oblast in Ukraine and given a governing administration in which 
the head was appointed by the president, but this was a far cry from the original aspirations of 
Rusyns.  
The collapse of the Soviet Union is a clear instance of political opportunity structure, as the 
system had a clear opening for change. Dozens of entities became independent states in the early 
1990s, so it was not unrealistic for Carpatho-Rusyns to petition for semi-independence at the 
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same time. However, this short window of time meant that Rusyns had to quickly recover and 
regroup after decades of Communism. Throughout the Soviet era, those in the homeland had 
some cultural “leaders” of the intelligista, but there was no clear figurehead that motivated 
Rusyns to break free of Communism and restore their sense of heritage. While there was now an 
increased level of popular access to the political system, Rusyns never resorted to violence or 
petitioned to intergovernmental organizations. 
This parallels the situation in the United States as those Rusyns living there were, overall, no 
longer interested in the political situation of their homeland. While there were scholars invested 
in the Rusyn situation, the group lacked an elite individual or group with political experience that 
was sufficient enough to advocate for their situation on the world stage. While there were 
sympathetic external powers such as Slovakia, Poland, and the United States, they could do little 
to challenge Ukraine’s statutes. Furthermore,  World Congress of Rusyns activists, “…agreed to 
end organizational ties with Provisional Government of Subcarpathian Rus', [which was] seen by 
the Ukrainian government as challenging the constitution (Cantin, 2012).” 
 
Cultural Maintenance 
At this point in time, the Rusyn’s sense of culture was recovering from its suppression 
during the Soviet era. For the last several decades, Rusyns had been stripped of their distinct 
identity and were only allowed to be identified as Ukrainian as well as speak the Ukrainian 
language. Furthermore, their sense of religion, often the most fundamental aspect of their culture, 
was repressed. Rusyns had to maintain any aspects of their distinct culture in secret, if at all, and 
enduring institutions to proliferate it. Because of these conditions and the overall limitation on 
geographic mobility, Rusyns were essentially cut off from their brethren in the diaspora during 
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the communist era, who also did very little to maintain culture. The “roots fever” of the United 
States in the 1970s sparked a revival in Rusyn-American folk groups during this decade, 
especially in larger cities with pre-existing Rusyn communities such as Cleveland, Pittsburgh, 
and Detroit (Magocsi, 1993, 65). However, the saliency of the folk groups lasted for no more 
than a decade, and the Rusyn-Americans overall fell out of touch with their ethnic heritage until 
the 1990s.  
The nationalist movements occurring across the continent motivated Rusyns to re-engage 
with their culture, too. Scholars and political activists in both Eastern Europe and the United 
States reconnected and formed Small civic and cultural organizations within months of the social 
and political changes and welcomed cross-border cooperation between each group. Each group 
existed on their belief that Carpatho-Rusyns were a distinctive ethnicity and so should be granted 
rights enjoyed by other national minorities (Magocsi, 2005). When those in the homeland finally 
had the freedom to express their identities, Central and Eastern Europeans were presented with, 
“an opportunity for public discussion of ethnic issues and the return to extremists positions in 
public discourse,” as well as the reawakening of pre-socialist angers. This revival of national 
identity in the early 1990s was a challenge as some struggled to fully reaccept this newly 
emerging cultural diversity (Haase, 2005, 222).  
Indeed, some Rusyns were actually reluctant to return to their old culture ways as doing so 
meant the economic guarantees of Soviet communism were no more. In her interviews with 
older residents of both the Prešov and Zakkarpatia regions, older generations remarked that the 
security of the communist era outweigh the freedoms of the 21st century in their idea of a good 
life. In addition, they believe that those in the West were lied to about the realities of 
communism, and that now they suffer under self-serving political parties (2012, 73). While this 
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is mostly in regard to the economic sphere of life, it does present the reluctance of many people 
to fully re-embrace distinctive Rusyn culture as they had become comfortable with speaking 
Ukrainian and adhering to Soviet practices that guaranteed a house and food. This challenged 
mobilization around gaining autonomy, and while Rusyns are awarded many more freedoms 
now in terms of celebrating culture, the lack of cohesion served neither the referendum vote nor 
any potential, subsequent protests against the refusal to implement it.  
The Rusyn language had fallen out of use both in the Soviet Union and the United States, so 
culture was not being preserved in this way in 1991. Lack of communication between the 
homeland and diaspora during the Soviet era also meant that the diaspora population was not 
contributing to their plan other than the intelligista. Because cultural institutions were still 
redeveloping (and continue to do so to this day), low levels of cultural maintenance did not assist 
the Rusyns in this attempt to gain autonomy as their muddled sense of identity gave many people 
no incentive to mobilize.  
 
Economic Functioning 
“The liquidation of factories and co-ops, the crumbling infrastructure and fears of 
corruption which discourage foreign investment, and the large investments required to scale-up 
to be competitive in global markets all contribute to the lack of work which pays a livable wage 
in the [Transcarpathian] region (Cantin, 2012, 80).” This is the stark reality of economic 
conditions and prosperity in 21st- century Transcarpathia. By 1990, most places where Rusyns 
and Rusyn-Americans lived were at least somewhat industrialized. There were villages that did 
not have a central business district (and still do not today), but the end of the Soviet era ushered 
in a new sense of globalization for those in Eastern Europe (Cantin, 2012).  
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Rusyns in Ukraine experienced a tumultuous and devastating decade in regards to 
finances after the state gained its independence. Its traditional agrarian culture did not set the 
state up for success when it became independent, and the disorganized nature of its transition to 
democracy exacerbated the problem. Rusyns in Transcarpathia, as well as all Ukrainians in the 
state, directly suffered as a result of this. The country experienced hyperinflation and an 
exceptionally huge production decline for a country not ravaged by a major war. “Official GDP 
collapsed by almost half from 1990 to 1994, and slow decline continued throughout the decade. 
Economic growth would not resume again until 2000. The budget deficit was, at 14.4 percent of 
GDP, exceptionally large. Barter and the use of surrogate moneys and foreign currencies 
prevailed. Ukraine had introduced a sovereign currency, the hryvnia, but it was little used. A 
shadow economy swelled and compensated for an unknown share of the economic collapse 
(Sutela, 2012).” 
 Throughout all of this, Rusyns in Transcarpathia could do little to improve their own 
economic situation because they were still reliant on state policies. Economic mobility was 
lacking as many were simply trying to financially stay afloat. Rusyns could do little to try to 
create economic relations with other states. These factors did not help in their attempts to gain 
autonomy in 1991, and while economic conditions have somewhat improved in Transcarpathia, 
their crumbling infrastructure and government corruption would not help a current attempt at 
autonomy as their situation has not drastically improved. 
 It is clear that the 1991 autonomy movement was another failure for the Rusyns, and it 
was similar to the 1848 movement in that it was largely the work of elites that made an active 
attempt to gain this status. It also parallels the first autonomy movement in that levels of cultural 
maintenance were not strong because of lack of coordination and communication among 
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community members. Weaknesses within economic functioning did not help either. Overall, high 
levels of political opportunity structure were the foundational factors that helped Rusyns make 
any type of movement during this time period, but lack of cultural maintenance or economic 









Conclusion: Where the Rusyns stand today and implications 
Carpatho-Rusyns are recognized as a nationality in Poland, Slovakia, and Romania, 
among others, where their organizations and publications receive state support (Best, 2013, 14). 
The Carpatho-Rusyns that live in Ukrainian territories today, however, almost completely lack 
the minority rights and protections that exist in other European states as there is presently a 
monolingual attitude among Ukrainian policymakers that Carpatho-Rusyns are simply a 
Ukrainian “sub-ethnos” group. In fact, “while the law on national minorities in Ukraine 
guarantees citizens’ right to freely choose their national identity, Rusyn was not an option as a 
nationality…” during the 2001 census (Csernicsko and Ferenc, 2014, 399). Because of this, 
official numbers of Rusyns in Ukraine do not exist, although estimates believe approximately 
8,000 Rusyns live in the Zakarpattia (Transcarpathia) region (Magocsi 2010). While Rusyns 
constitute the largest minority in the region, the state of Ukraine does not recognize their nation 
or their language as separate. This causes the Carpatho-Rusyns there to identify Ukrainian as 
their national identity, while also professing “Rusyn” contexts only in which they feel it is safe 
or noncontroversial to do so (Cantin, 2014, 850).  
This is a stark contrast to Rusyns in other states such as Slovakia, where Rusyn symbols 
are clearly visible in public and people evidently have a stronger, more positive sense of 
connection to the heritage. Cantin states that, “The issue in Zakarpattia is less about encouraging 
young people to value their [Rusyn] language and culture than it is about making it politically 
safe for them to use the word ‘Rusyn’ to describe themselves and their ethnicity and having 
economic resources beyond personal donations available for education and cultural programs 
(2014, 860).” Indeed, lack of official recognition is a contradiction because several Rusyn 
organizations are still registered lawfully, Rusyn language and culture are taught in Sunday 
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schools, and there are monuments and plaques across the territory dedicated to significant 
representatives of the Rusyn nation (Csernicsko and Ferenc, 2014, 404). Furthermore, Rusyns in 
Transcarpathia are dealt different economic conditions than their counterparts in other states. 
Despite the economic difficulties in the Prešov Region, conditions are better there than in 
Zakarpattia. Cantin reports that, “Infrastructure is an even greater problem in Zakarpattia than it 
is in the Prešov Region. Traveling across western Ukraine, it's easy to see that in Zakarpattia, 
cities are in greater disrepair, much dirtier, and more overgrown with weeds in public spaces 
than are other cities such as Kolomiya, Chernivtsi, or L'viv (2012, 77).” The contrasts between 
the two places presents the manifestation of ethnic identity expression or suppression. 
Rusyns are also recognized by other Western states that have large diaspora populations 
including the United States and Canada, which bolsters their cause. Activism has continued, 
especially stemming from the diaspora, which plays a key role not just in promoting Rusyn 
culture and identity, but in trying to convince Ukraine to recognize its Rusyn minority. This has 
garnered some federal attention on behalf of the United States as in 2005, then-U.S. Senator John 
McCain penned a letter to Ukrainian President Iushchenko advocating for Rusyns. McCain 
wrote, "that there is substantial scholarly support for the distinctiveness of the Rusyn people and 
language" and that "various bodies dealing with human and minority rights have taken note of 
their aspirations to self-identity (UNPO, 2005)."  
The Ukrainian government fears this very recognition could violate the unity of the 
young Ukrainian state and nation. Many political leaders see these ambitions as separatism, 
which tarnish the integrity of Ukraine, while others simply see Rusyns as a pseudo-minority 
(Csernicsko and Ferenc, 2014, 410). This is perhaps the most fundamental reason as to why 
Rusyns have to continue their struggle for basic recognition, let alone autonomy, in the current 
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time. Many believe that the Rusyn question has been demonized by its Ukrainian opponents 
because of the insecurity many of them feel about their own nationality, language, and culture, 
despite living in an independent state. Adding to this is the fact that nation-building is an 
ongoing process in Ukraine, and Ukrainophones still feel threatened by the domination of the 
Russian language and the large numbers of Russian speakers – and even more so since tensions 
between Ukraine and Russia have escalated since early 2014. The Rusyn question is usually 
condemned as a political movement instigated by hostile neighboring countries or foreign 
scholars and has been neglected since this time (Kuzio, 2005). 
The concerns of these current Ukrainian politicians are then masked by the seemingly 
liberal legislation that states the free choice and confession of one’s nationality is the private 
right of a citizen. In reality, Rusyns’ lack of an option to declare their identity on the Ukrainian 
census violates the liberal view that individuals have the right to free identification and the right 
to use their own language. This could simply be overturned by the state government by 
overwriting the statute based on the opinion of the National Academy of Sciences (Csernicsko 
and Ferenc, 2014, 406), but this would be too threatening to the current Ukrainian government 
dynamic. 
Receiving this acknowledgement from Ukraine, however, was – and still is – the biggest 
obstacle although almost 75 percent of Carpatho-Rusyns in Europe lived in their Transcarpathian 
region. Rusyns are not the only stateless nation who currently face this reality. Activist groups 
and cultural organizations have flourished across many areas of Europe and the United States, 
even within this century. In her study of Rusyns in the Presov and Zakkarpatia regions, Kristina 
Cantin reported, “…ample evidence that young people were continuing to participate in Rusyn 
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cultural organizations and perpetuate Rusyn practices (2012, 40).” There are currently no clear 
aspirations to attempt to reclaim autonomy as there was for the last two hundred years.  
Lack of attention or knowledge regarding the Rusyn question assumably leads to a lack 
of literature on the issue, especially in the English language. Throughout my research, I have 
been quite limited in my ability to reference a vast range of opinions, praises, and criticisms on 
Rusyn movements and history because there are only a few credible scholars who have done 
extensive research on the group. If the Rusyns want to work toward autonomy at some point in 
the future, and engage with their diaspora, I believe that more serious interaction with scholars is 
required. It will be difficult for anyone in the political sphere (who can make a difference in 
terms of autonomy) to connect with the Rusyn problem if they do not even know who the 
Rusyns are. Rusyns need exposure to the academic and political world on a much greater scale. 
Furthermore, Rusyns need to reexamine their level of engagement with the three factors 
(and their subfactors) throughout this thesis. In analyzing the three autonomy movements, high 
values of subfactors of the political opportunity structure seem to be the most significant factor 
in determining stateless nations level of success in reaching autonomy. Each movement began 
with petitions by political elites within the Rusyn movement, and the more that they were able to 
engage with state or multiple state governments, the greater the level of success. None of the 
movements began from strong levels of cultural maintenance or economic functioning. It is clear 
that sound political coordination is necessary to make an initial, strong impact, and ideally, 
strong cultural maintenance and economic functioning can be developed from there. High levels 
of these two factors can certainly be helpful in the initial push for autonomy, but they are not the 
catalyst for legitimate success. 
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Each autonomy movement also began at the height of an “opening” within the political 
system: the Spring of Nations in 1848, the end of World War I, and the collapse of the Soviet 
Union. State governments attempted to restructure themselves, and this gave Rusyns (especially 
elites) the chance to mobilize at a time when changes to the existing system were more 
“acceptable.” This does not necessarily mean that successful autonomy movements can only 
happen when there is an opening in the political system – but it does imply that the movement 
may have a greater chance of being considered by others as plausible. Once a movement is seen 
as legitimate by external entities, it becomes more possible for these entities to grant funds or 
resources for the group to develop their levels of cultural maintenance and economic functioning. 
This is made clear during the interwar period in Subcarpathian Rus’, where the Czechoslovak 
government provided their region with infrastructural and cultural improvements. This presents 
the case that political opportunity structure is driven both by the overall conditions of the region 
in which the group is located and conditions within the stateless nation.  
Furthermore, the case of the Rusyns presents how important certain groups of a stateless 
nation can be in attempting to gain political autonomy. Any time the Rusyns had elite group 
members who had connections to state or international governments, they were closer to gaining 
autonomy. Diaspora members and their level of engagement also proved to be a very important 
aspect of a stateless nation. The Rusyn-American diaspora of the early 20th century were 
indispensable in the second attempt to gain autonomy as they were the group to coordinate with 
national and international leaders. They were politically active and economically stronger 
compared to those in the homeland, so they were able to send funds to their counterparts in 
Eastern Europe. Conversely, the diaspora had decreased in cultural and political engagement 
with the homeland by 1991, when the group experienced another failure to gain autonomy. This 
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presents the potential power of a diaspora of a stateless nation and that they can have a 
considerable impact on the success of their homelands movement if they are engaging with those 
“who matter” – group elites as well as government allies – in an conducive way. Furthermore, 
the freedoms and changes that a diaspora group experiences can parallel that of those in the 
homeland, as they can be the ones that provide them with funds and other resources to live a 
more comfortable lifestyle or to make political changes. 
If Rusyns push to make any more attempts to gain political autonomy, especially in the 
Transcarpathian oblast, it is imperative that leaders employ strategies to increase political and 
social mobilization as well as economic functioning. While those in Prešov (and somewhat in 
Transcarpathia) have institutions that have led to a cultural revival, those in the United States do 
not have this same level of connection. Cultural institutions still exist, but they do little to 
connect with those in Ukraine, Slovakia, or Poland. Because of this, there are no concrete goals 
for Rusyns, which is necessary for another attempt at gaining autonomy. Furthermore, a lack of 
connection to identity presumably will lead to little reason to mobilize. Rusyns need a larger 
quantity of voices regarding their plight to propel them onto the world stage if autonomy is still 
of interest to them. Ukraine is currently entangled in conflict with Russia as well as internal 
struggles. Will Rusyns use this smaller opening in the political system to make a fourth push for 
Transcarpathia’s autonomy? If this is a possibility, it is imperative that Rusyns increase their 
connection to elites and the populace, economically empower members of their group, and 
encourage and educate the general Rusyn and Rusyn-American populace on their rich and 
distinct culture worthy of being recognized. Rusyns must learn from the shortcomings of their 
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